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In response to emerging apprehension and in anticipation of growing concern,
the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada (CGA-Canada)
issued a comprehensive paper on defined benefit pension plans in June of
2004. The goal of that CGA-Canada release titled Addressing the Pensions
Dilemma in Canada was to advance understanding of defined benefit (DB)
pension plans along with inherent risks and imperfections, to impart a reasonable
estimate of the standing of DB pension plans at December 31, 2003 and to
explore potential remedies for consideration by stakeholders. 
In a large part motivated by a steady stream of media coverage focusing on
pension plan shortfalls and a concern for the long-term viability of DB plans,
CGA-Canada has advocated for reforms and sees fit also to update December
31, 2003 estimates with a December 31, 2004 assessment. As such, this report
builds on CGA-Canada’s June 2004 publication with the goal of further
advancing public understanding. Serving as an update to the above noted 
seminal report, the reader can obtain background and increased context by
referring to Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada which can be found
by visiting www.cga-online.org 
Consistent with our initial findings, the issue of under-funded pension
plans has become one of the most perplexing financial issues facing 
business executives, legislators and Canadian pensioners who are or will in
the future be reliant on pension revenue as an important component of their
overall retirement incomes. Importantly, we would continue to support an
approach which corrects fundamental or structural imperfections or 
systemic influences such as surplus ownership and investment policy while
anticipating the impacts that these changes have on outcomes or symptoms
such as funding position.    
While there are a number of examples of what happens when pension
regimes become defective for workers, the current U.S. experience with
United Airlines and the St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp Company event in Canada
underscore that pension plan default can occur anywhere and within 
companies of any magnitude. Moreso, these occurrences demonstrate the need
to better preserve pension plan solvency and member protection. 
Foreword8
CGA-Canada remains committed to making a meaningful contribution to
the ongoing debate on pension issues facing Canadians. We trust also that 
the content of this report effectively expands on our earlier works while 
complementing the collective efforts of other professional organizations, 
regulators, plan sponsors, members and their representatives.  
Anthony Ariganello, FCGA, CPA (Delaware)
President and Chief Executive Officer
The Certified General Accountants Association of Canada
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Health and financial well-being, in the broadest sense, have emerged as two
of the most challenging issues facing Canadians in the new millennium.
Beneath the optimistic veneer of recently published employment and job 
creation data sit the realities of “off-shoring” and “outsourcing.” Traditional,
financially viable jobs, especially in Canada’s manufacturing sector have, at
an alarming rate been lost to lower paying service and part-time/temporary
work
1. Coincidental with the complex socio-economic implications of 
continued globalization is the internal stress posed by Canada’s large and
aging population of baby boomers. The post retirement expectations and
needs of the “boomer” generation, a group that will live longer than previous
generations, will place enormous demands on the country’s health and social
support systems. The ability of Canadians to maintain a financially comfortable
and healthy lifestyle after retirement has become one of this country’s most
vexing challenges and serves as the impetus of CGA-Canada’s seminal report
Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada released in June of 2004.  
For many Canadians, post-retirement health and well-being are increasingly
and inextricably tied to Canada’s pension system. Unfortunately, and the 
evidence is compelling, the pension system in this country has deteriorated
significantly. There are problems related to under-funding, to allegations of
archaic accounting practices and to sentiment of redundant legislation and
public policy.  
In some ways, the initial report on Canada’s pension dilemma by 
CGA-Canada represents ground zero in what can hopefully contribute to a
new pension paradigm for Canada. As an update to that work, the current
paper serves to confirm the predicted risks and the proposed actions for 
transformation. As a minimum, we need to accept that in order to address the
challenges before us; we need to acknowledge that the pension system is
gravely imperfect. Only then, can key decision-makers and stakeholders 
focus on creating a sustainable pension ‘system’ that is financially viable and 
appropriately aligned with the retirement needs of affected Canadians.
In the interest of clarity, reference to pension plans in this paper shall relate
specifically to defined benefit (DB) pension plans registered with a provincial
or federal pension authority unless otherwise expressed. This paper does not
address or represent the state of defined contribution (DC) pension plans, 
supplementary employee retirement plans (SERP), defined benefit pension plans
for Federal public employees (PSSA) or Quebec public employees (RREGOP).
Focusing primarily on single employer pension plans, multi-employer pension
Introduction
1  “Restructuring of full time workers: A Case of Transitional Dislocation or Social Exclusion in Canada —
lessons from the 1990s,” by Susan Silver, John Shields and Sue Wilson, Ryerson University (paper to
be published in 2005).10
plans which tend to attract different funding and accounting issues, have been
also excluded from findings and conclusions expressed herein.  
Importantly, and in the interest of maintaining year-to-year data consistency,
the analysis, findings, projections and comparisons in this paper have been
based upon the aggregate performance of 847 DB plans reviewed as at
December 31, 2003 and 784 DB plans reviewed as at December 31, 2004.
Serving as representative samples from which to draw conclusions, these
plans constitute approximately 30% of all such plans in Canada. As such, our
approach has been to evaluate the combined performance of many of the 
plans with which MERCER Human Resource Consulting has a professional
relationship and required composite knowledge. Consistent also with our 
earlier works, the Association has recognized the importance and appropriateness
of retaining the expertise of MERCER Human Resources Consulting in the
research and presentation of those findings. As a pension authority, MERCER
has contributed its in-depth expertise on the subject and has afforded the
empirical rigour from which conclusions may be drawn.  
In the following pages, we will examine the nature of funding deficits
while drawing a comparison between our 2003 and 2004 results. This is the
predominant purpose of this paper, a “what it looks like one year later”
account, if you will. We will not delve into the details of funding, investment
and accounting policy, which while still relevant, are more appropriately 
covered in our initial report on the subject. In short, this paper is offered to the
public as an update. We would encourage the reader to receive this report in
concert with our sentinel Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada paper
which can afford the proper backdrop and context. Through the succeeding
text, we will provide some narrative of current events and reflections.
This account was drawn from a variety of sources including contemporary
media and journal articles, relevant academic research, interviews with key
informants, and an analysis of position papers and speeches by knowledgeable
and influential business, public service and labour leaders.11
Consistent with CGA-Canada’s findings for the year ended December 31, 2003,
59% of Canadian defined benefit (DB) pension plans continue to be in deficit
at December 31, 2004. If we provide for indexation of benefits, those numbers
rise sharply to 95% and 96% respectively for the 2003 and 2004 years ending
December 31.
Not only has the estimated number of deficit DB plans not improved; but
the magnitude of the aggregate deficit has swelled significantly. With indexation
of accrued benefits, it is estimated that the additional funding required to fully
fund those deficit plans has grown from $160 billion at the end of 2003 to
$190 billion at the end of 2004. When we ignore indexation, which is not 
particularly rational, we estimate that funding requirements distend from $26
billion at the end of 2003 to $29 billion at the end of 2004. Neither scenario
is heartening to plan members.
If we isolate those plans in deficit forming part of our study, at December
31, 2003 and 2004 respectively, we can produce the results depicted in Table
1 below. In a large part, the table has been adapted from last year’s study and
then expanded to include 2004 findings. What is interesting is that it clearly
demonstrates a weakening of the funding ratio of deficit plans between 2003
and 2004 and further corroborates last year’s projections to 2008. So without
being unnecessarily alarmist, results one year later are consistent with earlier
prospects and are in fact inferior to the expected trajectory. Given a choice, it
would have been preferable to have been wrong.          
Executive Summary 1
2  For 751 DB plans in deficit at December 31, 2004
3  For 802 DB plans in deficit as at December 31, 2003
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required to fully fund
those deficit plans has
grown from $160 billion
at the end of 2003 to
$190 billion at the end
of 200412
While we can reasonably expect respectable investment returns as were
witnessed in late 2003 and 2004, much ground needs be made up to compensate
for low interest rates and the poor equities market performance of 2001 and
2002. Made all the more vulnerable by declining contributor to member 
participation ratios and the ongoing sensitivity of Canada’s financial markets,
CGA-Canada continues to advocate for proactive deficit funding strategies
which do not rely solely on hopeful corrections in investment portfolios.       
Under-funded pension plans has become, and will continue to be, a major
financial issue for business executives, legislators and Canadians who are now
or will in future be dependent on pension income.  
In its initial response to Canada’s evolving ‘pension dilemma’CGA-Canada
focused on two key insights. First, under-funding is in and of itself a serious
pension problem in Canada. Secondly, and perhaps of greater importance, the
pension dilemma is systemic in nature. In other words, while pension under-
funding is a challenge, it is more importantly a symptom of deeper problems
rooted within the larger pension administration regime. There are deeper
structural problems that will need to be corrected; some of which are being
grappled with today. Actions to improve the state of under-funded pension
plans will of course be necessary and beneficial. Nevertheless, unless the basic
pension system is re-aligned to meet current and emerging socio-economic
realities, these symptom fixes can be short-lived.  
For a comprehensive review of CGA-Canada’s policy recommendations, the
reader is encouraged to refer to the sentinel report which delineates prescriptive
findings and advice. For sake of convenience, these recommendations have
been reproduced as “Appendix A” of this paper.     
Under-funded pension
plans will continue to be
a major financial issue13
Difference Between Funding and Accounting
There is often confusion between the concepts of pension funding and pension
accounting. 
Simply stated, pension funding is the amount of cash that is set aside to
secure the pension promises made by a plan sponsor to plan members. The
amount of cash set aside in a particular year is the function of multiple factors
such as the organisation’s availability of cash, alternative investment 
opportunities as well as minimum and maximum funding requirements as
respectively defined by provincial and federal pension standards legislation
4
and the Income Tax Act.
Pension accounting represents the cost of a pension plan as reported by an
organisation in its financial statements. Pension accounting is not shaped by
the factors that influence pension funding. Pension accounting is based on a
set of principles and rules established by accounting standard setting bodies
(e.g. Accounting Standards Board in Canada and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board in the U.S.) to enhance comparability between different
organisations’ financial results.
Funding Requirements in Canada
As mentioned, an employer establishing a pension plan for Canadian employees
must fund the plan at a pace which, at a minimum, meets the requirements of
the pension standard legislation applicable to its pension plan
5. The minimum
funding requirements are determined from an actuarial valuation which must
be carried out at least every three years. The actuarial valuation involves 
comparing the value of plan assets with the value of the benefits (also called
plan liabilities) that the plan is expected to pay in the future. The ratio of the
value of plan assets to the value of plan liabilities is often referred to as the
funding ratio or funding level. For example, a plan with assets worth $80 million
and liabilities valued at $100 million will be said to have a funding ratio or
level of 80%.
When determining the minimum funding requirements, pension standards
legislation requires an actuarial valuation be made under the following 
two bases:
1.  A going-concern basis, which focuses on the ability of the plan to meet its
obligations assuming that the plan continues in existence.
How the Funding Position of
Pension Plans Was Measured 2
4  Each province has its own set of rules for pension funding. The federal government also has a set of
pension funding rules for federally regulated companies.
5  Pension plans are registered in the province with the plurality of members.
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2.  A solvency basis, which focuses on the ability of the plan to meet its 
obligations assuming that the plan is terminated at the calculation date.
Both bases require the determination of several assumptions. Assumptions
under the going-concern basis are normally left to the discretion of the
Actuary based on the specifics of the pension plan to be valued. In the 
selection of appropriate assumptions, the Actuary is guided by actuarial 
standards of practice issued by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries.
Commonly, the actuary will allow for future increases in benefits and will use
a value of plan assets which may or may not fully reflect the fair market value
of the assets. Deficits arising from application of the going-concern basis are
to generally be made up over a period not exceeding fifteen years.
Assumptions under the solvency basis are largely prescribed by pension
standards legislation, leaving little room for discretion, and are based on 
market interest rates at the date of the valuation. Generally, no allowance is
made for future increases in benefits and the value of plan assets correspond
to the fair market value. However, in some jurisdictions (e.g. Ontario), in order
to reduce the volatility of the funding level and ultimately the contributions to
the plan, it is permitted to average the interest rates used to value the plan 
liabilities and the plan assets over a period not exceeding five years. Deficits
arising on the solvency basis are generally made up over a period not exceeding
five years.
There is also a third way to measure the funding situation of a pension plan.
Referred to as the wind-up basis, this approach is similar to the application 
of the solvency basis. With the proviso however that it does not allow for 
the exclusion of certain benefits payable upon termination of the plan as 
solvency valuations may permit, and requires the use of the fair market value
of plan assets.
The Actuarial Basis Used in this Study 
In measuring the funding situation of pension plans in Canada, we have 
chosen to use a basis which could be described as follows:
• It is a going-concern basis, i.e. it assumes that pension plans will continue
in existence.
• It uses a risk free interest rate, i.e. a rate corresponding to the yields on
long-term government bonds.
• It allows for future increases in benefits, before and after retirement.
• It assumes retirement assumptions in accordance with those used by the
actuary who performed the original valuation.
• It assumes future mortality that recognizes future improvements in 
pensioners’ longevity.
• It uses the fair market value of plan assets.
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Table 2 below provides a summary of the main assumptions underlying 
the basis.
These assumptions are appropriate in comparing the funding position of various
pension plans for the following reasons:
• It removes the inherent discretion in selecting assumptions for actuarial
valuations performed on a going-concern basis, i.e. it allows for a common
vision of future market conditions.
• It provides results on a risk free basis as it removes the influence of the
investment policies in the selection of the actuarial assumptions.
But it should be noted that very few pension plans in the market place are 
currently funded using a similar basis. Typically, pension plans are funded
using a higher than expected interest rate and a weaker mortality table which,
if applied to this study, would show lower pension deficits or greater pension
surpluses. In this way, the study can be seen as a conservative assessment of
the current funding situation of pension plans in Canada.
6  Determined from the yields on long-term bonds of Government of Canada.
7  Represents a blended rate of pre-retirement indexation (based on wage increases) and post-retirement
indexation (based on CPI increases).
8  UP94G stands for uninsured pensioners’ mortality table 1994 generational. This table allows for expected
future improvements in pensioner’s mortality and is currently seen as a best-estimate mortality table.





- without indexation of benefits 0% 0%
- with indexation of benefits 3.0% 3.25%
Mortality table
8 UP94G UP94G
Retirement Age As per respective  As per respective 
plan designs plan designs
December 31, 2003 December 31, 2004
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Limits of the Exercise
Readers are cautioned that the results presented in this section have a very
short life span. The funding situation of pension plans is affected by a large
number of factors (e.g. level of interest rates, stock market performance, 
inflation, improvements in longevity, etc.), with changes to these variables
occurring frequently. Therefore, in assessing the financial health of pension plans,
the date on which the calculations are performed affects greatly the resulting
valuations. The results have been calculated as at December 31, 2003 and of
December 31, 2004 respectively, and as such, should be seen as a snapshot of
actuality at those precise points in time and be interpreted in this light.
Data
This study is based on data included in the MERCER Pension Database (MPD).
The MPD contains information on the pension plans across Canada for which
MERCER Human Resource Consulting provides actuarial and consulting 
services. The MPD includes information about plan design, plan membership,
target asset mix, and the most recent actuarial valuation assumptions and
results under the going-concern and solvency bases. The database is updated
annually.
The samples studied contained some 847 plans covering 1,590,000 members
for 2003 and some 784 plans covering 1,787,000 members for 2004. More
plans were excluded from the 2004 analysis due to data defects contained 
in some plan profiles which arise as the result of incomplete information,
incongruent solvency and funding valuation dates, or outdated valuation
dates. However, the variation in sample size does not materially affect the
overall results since most of the rejected plans are very or relatively small.
Overall, the pension plans included in this study represent roughly 30% of
Canadian DB market. Furthermore, it is believed that the set of plans included
in the MPD is representative of the overall Canadian market, with the exception
of Multi Employer Pension Plans (MEPPs) which are under-represented.  
Finally, the data on pension plans for federal public employees (PSSA) and
Quebec public employees (RREGOP) is publicly available but has not been
included in this study on the basis that they are not subject to the same funding
issues/problems as other pension plans in Canada and inclusion would serve
to bias comparability of results.
The Funding Position of Pension Plans
in Canada as at December 31, 2004 3
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The Methodology
In this study, the results of the last funding valuation (assets and liabilities) were
adjusted and subsequently projected to December 31, 2003 and December 31,
2004 respectively.
The projection of the plan assets was done on a market value basis based
on the target asset mix of the plan and on the return of the corresponding index
over the period. The indexes used were as follows:
• Canadian Equities: S&P/TSX Composite
• U.S. Equities: S&P 500 ($Cdn)
• International Equities: MSCI EAFE ($Cdn)
• Fixed-in Income: Scotia Capital Universe Bonds
The projected December 31, 2003 and December 31, 2004 plan liabilities
were arrived at by extrapolating the going-concern liabilities from the last 
valuation and then adjusted. Cash flows on plan assets and liabilities in the
extrapolation period (e.g. service cost, employee and employer contributions,
benefit payments) were estimated based on the results of the last valuation 
of the plan.
The Overall Results of the 2003 and 2004 Studies
Table 3 (with no indexation) and Table 4 (with indexation) present overall
positions of the 2003 and 2004 studies, comparing pension plans which were
in a deficit position to those which were in a surplus position at the end of
December of 2003 and of 2004. For each group of plans, these tables provide
the number of plans studied, the value of plan assets and plan liabilities, the
funding surplus or deficit and the funding ratio, i.e. the ratio of plan assets to
plan liabilities, under the two bases of future indexation of benefits.
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Table 4: Overall Funding Results with Indexation of Benefits
Plans with 
Deficit 802 205.2 277.1 (71.9) 74%
Plans with 
Surplus 45 4.8 4.0 0.8 120%
Total 847 210.0 281.1 (71.1) 75%
December 31, 2003
Plans with 
Deficit 751 220.6 310.5 (89.9) 71%
Plans with 
Surplus 33 2.7 2.2 0.5 123%
Total 784 223.3 312.7 (89.4) 71%
December 31, 2004
Number
Plan Assets  Plan  Surplus/
Funding Status
of Plans
Market Value Liabilities (Deficit)
Ratio ($Bn) ($Bn) ($Bn)
Number
Plan Assets  Plan  Surplus/
Funding Status
of Plans
Market Value Liabilities (Deficit)
Ratio ($Bn) ($Bn) ($Bn)
Table 3: Overall Funding Results with no Indexation of Benefits 
Number
Plan Assets  Plan  Surplus/
Funding Status
of Plans
Market Value Liabilities (Deficit)
Ratio ($Bn) ($Bn) ($Bn)
Plans with 
Deficit 496 38.9 46.7 (7.8) 83%
Plans with 
Surplus 351 171.1 138.5 32.6 124%
Total 847 210.0 185.2 24.8 113%
December 31, 2003
Number
Plan Assets  Plan  Surplus/
Funding Status
of Plans
Market Value Liabilities (Deficit)
Ratio ($Bn) ($Bn) ($Bn)
Plans with 
Deficit 460 45.5 54.1 (8.6) 84%
Plans with 
Surplus 324 177.8 145.6 32.2 122%
Total 784 223.3 199.7 23.6 112%
December 31, 2004
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The overall funding position “with no indexation of benefits” as at December 31,
2004 is very similar to that of the previous year. The solid investment returns
in 2004 (about 9.5% for a typical asset mix
9) and supplemental 2004 funding
contributions have nevertheless been offset by a reduction (of about 0.25%) in
the long-term bond yield of the Government of Canada. The percentage of
plans in deficit position remained constant at 59%.
The overall funding position “with indexation of benefits” has slightly
deteriorated, mainly due to the increase in the assumed long-term expected
pension indexation
10 (from 3% to 3.25%). This reflects the anticipated increase
in the long term inflation rate of the market. The percentage of pension plans
in deficit is slightly higher than that of last year (96% versus 95%).
Snapshot(s) of the Canadian Market
To illustrate the extent of the funding deficit situation of pension plans in
Canada, the results of this study were extrapolated to the entire Canadian 
market as were those of our previous year’s findings. Table 5 below 
summarizes the funding deficits of the years ended December 31, 2003 and
2004 respectively under the two bases (no indexation and with indexation). 
Relying on the premise that the plans studied represent approximately 30%
of the overall Canadian defined benefit pension plan market, we have projected
that the funding position of the totality of DB plans in deficit has worsened
regardless of the rate of indexation. 
Under no indexation of benefits, the gap is $26 billion for 2003 year-end
and $29 billion for 2004 year-end whereas if future indexation of benefits is
considered, both before and after retirement, the funding gap is $240 billion
and $300 billion for the 2003 and 2004 year ends. In reality, many plans do
not adjust pension after retirement and not all pension plans provide for full
9  35% Canadian equities, 12% U.S. equities, 10% international equities, 40% fixed income and 3% money
market.
10  This assumption reflects a blended rate of pre-retirement indexation (based on wage increases) and
post-retirement indexation (based on CPI increases).
11  The subject DB pension plans studied by MERCER Human Resources Consulting and CGA-Canada are
plans with which MERCER has a professional relationship and required composite knowledge and which
collectively are deemed to constitute approximately 30% of the Canadian market. 
12  (No indexation $7.8Bn/.3=$26Bn; With indexation $71.9Bn/.3=$240Bn)  
13  (No indexation $8.6Bn/.3=$29Bn; With indexation $89.9Bn/.3=$300Bn)
Table 5: Snapshot(s) of the Canadian DB Market
11
No Indexation 26 29 3 11.5
With Indexation 240 300 60 25.0
Change in Funding 
Bases
December 31, 2003 December 31, 2004 Deficit Over 
Funding Deficit
12 Funding Deficit
13 One Year Period
($Bn) ($Bn)
$Bn %
The percentage of 
plans in deficit position
remained constant 
at 59%
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indexing of benefits prior to retirement
14, therefore the real funding gap can be
estimated to be somewhere between these two numbers.
With the assistance of MERCER, it was estimated that the funding gap 
of defined benefit plans in deficit in Canada could reasonably be pegged at
$160 billion at the end of 2003 and $190 billion at the end of 2004. These
numbers have been arrived at based on the assumption that all pension plans,
regardless of their type, would be indexed somewhat one way or another
before retirement. In so far as providing for indexation after retirement, it was
assumed that pension plans which currently provide automatic indexation
(e.g. 17% of all 2003 plans) would continue to do so in the future and that all
others would provide an average indexation of 1% per annum.
14  Final average plans allows for full indexing of benefits up to retirement while flat and career plans will
tend to be improved on an ad-hoc basis which might or might not allow for full indexing of benefits up to
retirement.
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Estimated Funding Contributions in 2005
Based on each plan’s actual funding basis, Table 6 presents a comparison of
estimated funding contributions to be made in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
That is, 2004 estimates
15 are based on 2003 results relating to the 847 plans
under consideration and 2005 estimates are based on 2004 results relating to
the 784 plans under consideration. 
An important limitation of the above calculations is that the format would
suggest that contributions can and will be made at one precise point in 
time or interval. In practice though, the real or actual timing of sponsor 
contributions will manifest themselves very differently depending on a number
of inter-active factors. These factors can include, but are not limited to, such
actualities as legitimate smoothing mechanisms for going-concern position,
Funding Implications 4
15  Based on MERCER Pension Database (MPD) representing approximately 30% of the Canadian Defined
Benefit Pension Plan market. 
16  The methodology used by MERCER to estimate funding contributions is very complex and embodies a
number of necessary assumptions too numerous to transmit effectively.  
Table 6: Estimated Funding Contributions
16
Plan Status Employee Employer Employer  Total









Payroll Payroll Payroll Payroll
Solvency Deficits 
at Dec. 31, 2003 1,600 4% 3,854 10% 4,536 11% 9,990 25%
(603 plans)
Solvency   
Surpluses at 
Dec. 31, 2003 258 3% 349 4% 24 0% 631 7%
(244 plans)








Dec. 31, 2004 159 2% 269 4% 34 1% 462 6%
(212 plans)
Total 1,984 3.7% 3,723 7.5% 5,250 10.3% 10,957 21.3%
(784 plans)
2005 Estimates
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use of aggregate actuarial methods for large plans, solvency smoothing for
Ontario plans, staggered filing dates of actuarial valuations, contribution 
holidays or the use of certified special payment schedules relying on outdated
or renewed estimates.
Observations
In comparing estimated funding contributions to be made in 2005 by members
and employers (broken down between solvent and insolvent plans), a review
of Table 6 reveals that expected special payments in 2005 ($5.2 billion) would
be higher than the previous year’s expected ($4.5 billion), whereas the expected
employer service costs would be decreased from $4.2 billion to $3.7 billion.
Further review of the data contained in the MPD exposes that these resulting
variations are in large part explained by changes in the results of a few very
large plans.
It should be recognized that funding contributions to a pension plan comprise
employee required contributions, if any, and employer contributions which
include current service costs and special payments which may be required to
fund going-concern and/or solvency deficits. As outlined in CGA-Canada’s
2004 report, the cost of pension plans has greatly escalated over recent times
as may be evidenced by the amount of money represented in Table 6 and the
correlating percentages as a function of payroll. The order of magnitude can
in itself be alarming to an unfamiliar reader but all the more so if we consider
that the collection of plans having funding deficits can attract up to a 25% 
surcharge on payroll costs. While much can be deduced from the information
provided in the above table, one very significant observation is that pension
cost is a considerable driver in the determination of employer compensation
costs and there does not seem to be any real or anticipated relief on the 
immediate horizon. 
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Since the publication of Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada in 2004,
there has been a noticeable increase in media coverage related to the issues of
retirement, pension plan solvency and sustainability. While much has been
said about the problem of ‘under-funding’per se, further analysis has revealed
that pension plan administration is unduly complex and is plagued by ‘pension
system’shortcomings. Drawing on the findings of our initial review, CGA-Canada
asserted that “Regrettably, market performance of the various investment
devices which have hampered the health of pension funds coupled with low
interest rates which have served to inflate pension liabilities have been cause
for much attention when in fact there are deeper systemic problems which
require redressing.” 
Research by the Wharton School’s Pension Research Council
17 readily 
supports the assertion that post retirement in Canada is a ‘systemic’ problem
and has explicitly identified two important trends in the configuration of
Canada’s private pension system that were somewhat predictable a couple of
years back: 
1.  The decline in the relative importance of pension plans covered by pension
legislation (i.e. Registered Pension Plans — RPPs) in favour of group 
savings vehicles (i.e. Registered Retirement Savings Plans — RRSPs) that
are not covered by these laws.
2. Complementary to the first trend is the shift away from Defined Benefit
(DB) pension plans to Defined Contribution (DC) plans, plus the additional
realization that the growth of DC plans has been most pronounced outside
of the pension regulatory framework.
The once vaunted Ontario Teachers’Pension Plan (OTPP) represents a real
world example of the ‘system versus symptom’ pension debate. In terms of
symptoms, a recent article in The Globe and Mail characterized the OTPP
problem as follows: “despite a top-notch investment record, the Pension fund
is facing a shortfall in funds.”
18
On the surface (i.e. symptomatically), the problem with the OTPP plan is a
deficit that has ballooned to over $19 billion. Obviously there is a crisis brewing
with the plan. However, to quote Pension Plan CEO Claude Lamoureaux, the
deeper issue is that “there are too many teachers in retirement and too few
teachers in the classroom.” For example, in 1990, the active teacher to retiree
ratio was 4:1. This ratio has further deteriorated to 1.6:1 in 2004 and is 
The Nature of the Pension 
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17  Pozzechon, Silvana. 2004. “The Future of Pensions in Canada” The Pension Research Council, The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
18  Church, Elizabeth and Willis Andrew. June 27, 2005. “Teachers’ big problem: How to find $19.4 billion”
The Globe and Mail, Pension Funds.
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projected to decline further to 1.3:1 by 2014. Mr. Lamoureux’s near term 
strategy will be to match future indexing with plan assets. In other words his
plan to re-establish the overall integrity of the OTPP includes a better balance
of assets to liabilities, which in turn is closely related to the ratio of working
teachers to retirees.
“the Lamoureaux strategy will be keenly watched — the fund is ahead 
of the demographic boom, and before long its woes will be felt by other
retirement plans.”
19
In a broader context, the OTPP reflects a problem which extends beyond
Ontario teachers. For years the OTPP has been the benchmark of pension 
solvency and sustainability. That it now finds itself in a serious deficit situation
serves as a barometer of things to come for the larger Canadian pension system.
It seems obvious from the OTPP example that, while very often the 
presenting issue with pensions is funding deficits, there are in fact deeper
structural problems that need correcting, including, for example, the funding
of deficits, the ownership of surpluses, issues of relevancy with respect to 
pension legislation as well as concerns related to contentious accounting and
actuarial practices.  
And as the example of the OTPP reflects, issues related to demographics,
traditional and perhaps outdated retiree expectations and paternalism only serve
to exacerbate structural challenges. The solvency and long-term sustainability
of Canada’s pension system will undoubtedly depend on how well stakeholders
understand, anticipate, and act “systemically” in addressing those challenges. 
A Pensions Paradox
In updating the information contained in Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in
Canada, it became obvious to CGA-Canada that while much of the complexity
of Canada’s pension system resides in its administrative, regulatory and financial
structures, it is equally clear that the dilemma being posed by pensions
involves and is affected by the expectations, perceptions, passion and emotions
of its many and varied stakeholders.  
The global consulting firm Watson Wyatt
20 reported in June 2005 that
approximately 11% of large companies that offer traditional pension plans
either terminated them or froze benefits in 2004. More importantly the report
goes on to state that four of these major employers with falling profits and big
pension problems (i.e. Ford, General Motors, United Airlines and Continental
Airlines) “gave their top executives huge retirement payments.” Paradoxically,
whereas unfunded pension obligations at Ford (U.S.) have risen to $12.3 billion,
Ford Chief Executive William Clay Ford Jr., has collected $53 million over
19  Church, Elizabeth and Willis, Andrew. June 27, 2005. “Teachers’ big problem: How to find $19.4 billion”
The Globe and Mail, Pension Funds.
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the past 3 years. General Motors followed a similar pattern awarding CEO
Richard Waggoner $40.7 million over the same period within which a pension
shortfall of $7.5 billion has amassed.
In the face of these revelations, it’s not hard to understand the hard-line
position that Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) negotiators have taken on wage
and benefit demands as they head into the current round of bargaining with
Ford, General Motors and Daimler Chrysler in Canada.
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As the so-called pension paradox suggests, there are fundamental structural
problems at the core of Canada’s pension dilemma. That is not to suggest that
specific issues like under-funding, alleged out-dated accounting rules and
practices and inflexible pension regulations in and of themselves are not 
problematic. Symptoms are also problems. Funding, accounting, investment
and benefit policy are key elements in the structure of the pension system.
Individually, interactively and collectively, they have a significant impact on
the overall integrity of the system.  
Funding and Investment Policy Update
CGA-Canada’s report, Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada, established
that funding has become a serious issue with many of Canada’s defined 
pension plans. At December 31, 2003, 59% of Canadian defined pension plans
were in deficit. Assuming indexation of accrued benefits, this translated into
the need for an additional $160 billion to fully fund those deficits. One year
later, again based on data furnished by MERCER Human Resource Consulting,
that amount has been recast at $190 billion.
And as of December 31, 2003, the average pension fund in Canada was
invested 56% in equities, 37% in various types of bonds, 2% in real estate and
5% in other instruments. 
It had been predicted that future cycles of surplus/deficit in pension plans
would be inevitable given the tendency for most plan sponsors to heavily
invest plan assets in equities. Interestingly, equities still comprise 57% of the
investment portfolio. This has proven advantageous albeit relatively more risky. 
In July 2005, an article appearing in The Globe and Mail reported that
“Canadian pension plans are likely in the worst shape in two years.”
21
Relatively consistent with CGA-Canada’s findings, the article explains that
the assets of a typical pension plan were only 79% of what was needed as of
the end of June, compared to 120% in the fall of 2000 and 84% six months
earlier. The reason for the “backsliding” is said to be declining interest rates. 
Most recently and on a very positive note, significant stock market 
recovery was reported in the month of July 2005. According to Globe and
Mail journalist David Parkinson, “It’s raining earnings. And investors are
singing in the rain.”
22 Parkinson goes on to state that the S&P/TSX composite
surged 132.78 points to 10,500.67 and the S&P/TSX 60 rose 8.04 points to
591.23 — new 57 month closes for both.
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21  Durbin, Dee-Ann. July 18, 2005. “Big Three, CAW launch contract talks” The Globe and Mail, Automotive.
22  Parkinson, David. July 28, 2005. “Profit Picture gives Investors Something to Dance About” The Globe
and Mail.
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In considering estimated funding contributions to be made in 2005 by
members and sponsors (broken down between solvent and insolvent plans),
the MERCER data also reveals that anticipated “special payments” of $5.2 billion
are higher than the expected $4.5 billion calculated one year earlier, whereas
the expected employer service cost has decreased from $4.2 billion to $3.7 
billion. MERCER further suggests that these variations are largely explained by
changes in the results of a few very large plans.
In a similarly positive vein, the majority of CFOs surveyed by Watson
Wyatt
23 expect that 2004 long-term bond yields will be the same or higher than
they were at the end of 2003. This, if correct, will be good news for pension
plans because long-term bond yields are a major driver of pension expense
(for financial statement purposes) and the state of pension plan solvency.  
However, in the face of these more optimistic perspectives are the continuing
economic woes of major Canadian employers including, for example Stelco,
Ford, General Motors and Daimler Chrysler. All four contend that burgeoning
employee benefit costs are a major cause of their economic problems. Emotion
and rhetoric aside, it is sobering to think that Stelco’s pension liabilities alone
(which are in excess of $1 billion) far exceed the approximately $300 million
in funds that are available through Ontario’s Pension Guarantee Fund.  
And even in the face of strong investment returns on pension coffers, how
do we explain the events currently transpiring with United Airlines. In the
spring of 2005, a bankruptcy judge approved a deal between the airline and
government that allowed the carrier to terminate its pension plans in what
could potentially be the largest corporate pension default in U.S. history. In
essence, the deal consists of eliminating pension plans covering 120,000
members as part of a restructuring effort to realign its costs and attract the 
requisite financing needed to step out from court protection. The four pension
plans are under-funded to the tune of $10 billion U.S. and the government 
will guarantee $6.6 billion U.S. through the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation (PBGC) which is itself running at $23 billion U.S. deficit. This
leaves a $3.4 billion variance which will translate into deep and permanent
cuts in retirement benefits to members, while downloading increased burden
onto the American public. This whole issue has been the subject of the first
ever ‘Online Congressional Hearing’ which took place over the summer
months of this year. 
And what of the St. Anne-Nackawic pulp mill in New Brunswick. The 
mill closed without warning approximately one year ago putting some 400
employees out of work. The mill filed for bankruptcy and a firm was appointed
by the province to administer the pension fund for the mill workers. After 
the dust had settled, it was determined that the company’s two plans were
under-funded by about $30 million making it unclear as to whether mill
employees would get the pension they are owed. By December, 2004, it had
23  Reed, G. Edward, Markham, Ian, Watson Wyatt Worldwide and Financial Executives International,
November, 2004. “Is There a Pension Plan Crisis? The Perspectives, Reactions and Strategies of
Canadian CFOs” Conference Board of Canada.
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been determined that workers under the age of 55 years would receive no 
pension benefits. 
Now, while an argument could be made that these concerns do not result
from funding and investment policy per se but could be attributable to 
regulation and enforcement, they are intrinsically linked. Some might also
suggest that member protections are afforded in the long term by regulation,
but experience tells us that in economic downturn, all bets are off. The long
and the short of it is that plan insolvency is problematic and companies are 
by definition constructs of the law which have a finite life. So, otherwise
financially viable plans can and will eventually wind down; sometimes with
devastating effects. The true answer lies in recognizing pension benefits as
deferred compensation which is contractually and legitimately owed to the
worker, and as such, should be managed and preserved for that sole purpose.   
The complexity of the pension system is further reflected in a recent article
published by the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) wherein the CLC suggests
that there are two false myths circulating with respect to pensions
24:
1.  that there is excess regulation; and
2. that risk asymmetry (i.e. sponsors bearing total cost of under-funding but
having to share surpluses on partial windups, etc.) is distorted.
The CLC contends the asymmetry claim is totally inconsistent with employers
taking contribution holidays and asking plan members to restrain other wage
and benefit demands in order to pay off pension deficits.
In the opinion of Joe Hornyak, executive editor of Benefits and Pensions
Monitor
25 the whole issue of funding/deficits asymmetry is merely an accounting
or actuarial number. In his opinion a better way to measure pension plans is to
know if sponsors are meeting current retiree needs. He proceeds to explain
that current accounting/actuarial targets relative to future funding obligations
put companies at financial risk, which is unfair and ill-advised. In his opinion
the use of market value is a fair and more accurate measure of a plan’s status.  
Accounting and Actuarial Update
In Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada, CGA-Canada expressed the
concern that accounting rules for pension plans are not serving the investment
community well. For example, plans with large deficits can legitimately defer
recognition of obligations in such a way that they do not appear on corporate
balance sheets. According to a study by National Bank Financial, off balance
sheet deficits of 79 Canadian companies (representing approx. 80% of
S&P/TSX market capitalization) at the end of 2002 amounted to $21 billion.
While a richer discussion on accounting and actuarial issues (including
24  Georgetti, Ken, president, Canadian Labour Congress. March 17, 2005. "Workplace Pensions: Current
Difficulties and Going Forward". 
25  Hornyak, Joe, executive editor. June 27, 2005 interview “the current status of DB pensions in Canada:
issues, opportunities” Benefits and Pensions Monitor, PowerShift Communications Inc.
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reliance on the expected rate of return on plan assets, amortization of gains
and losses, amortization of past service costs and smoothing of plan assets)
can be found in Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada, an elementary
scan of recent events reveals that: 
1. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the United
States Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have agreed to work
to better harmonize pension accounting rules, however there is no indication
at this time as to progress made to date in particular respect to pension
accounting standards.
2.  While there had been some passive hope that the IASB would adopt a standard
similar to that of United Kingdom’s Financial Reporting Standard No. 17
(FRS17) and at the same time eliminating the controversial ‘expected
return on plan assets’component of pension expense, the IASB has provided
only optional guidance. That is, the IASB has modified its standard to
allow employers to recognize pension cost on a market basis (instead of
deploying smoothing constructs available through amortization mechanisms)
but has made it optional rather than compulsory.
3.  In the absence of any real accord or impetus on the parts of American and
International fronts, it is unlikely that the Canadian Accounting Standards
Board (AcSB) will be compelled to further investigate Handbook Section
3461 (employee future benefits) while so many important pressures are
concurrently bearing down on the standard-setting industry.    
4.  Effective February 2005, commuted values (or transfer values) under 
registered pension plans have to be calculated under a new valuation basis.
This new basis better reflects market linkage between economic assumptions
and recognition of mortality improvements over more than 20 years. The
good news is that this represents responsible policy and more realistic 
modelling. The bad news: this change can be expected to intensify solvency
liabilities by 3% to 5% on average. 
Legislation and Public Policy Update
Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada recommends that pension 
legislation should be harmonized across provincial jurisdictions. In other
words, pension regulators must uniformly apply common rules, which in and
of themselves should collectively take a more proactive approach and 
monitor more closely those pension plans that are in a deficit position, including
for example:
1.  requiring more frequent actuarial valuations where conditions warrant;
2.  placing constraints on the level of investment risks taken by the pension fund;
3. adding plan requirements for sponsors who wish to improve benefits of
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4.  an untainted enforcing of regulation; 
5.  requiring targeted communications to plan members; and
6.  ensuring that pension plans attract strong vigilance by Boards of Directors
as well as ensuring that Board members are qualified or otherwise 
independently guided to act on pension issues. 
Regrettably, some of the rules have been relaxed rather than tightened. For
example, it has been noted that some pension regulators have started to review
their solvency funding requirements for DB pension plans in favour of 
loosening current or pre-existing requirements. For example:
•  Changes to federal pension legislation will provide relief to companies
entering a creditor protection process. As a result, a company such as 
Air Canada was permitted to amortize existing pension deficiencies over a
10-year period instead of the traditional 5-year provided for by law.
•  New Brunswick has amended legislation such that the Superintendent can
approve requests for extensions to the amortization period for solvency
deficiencies.
•  Nova Scotia has amended legislation to exclude solvency liability from
“grow-in” provisions.
•  Manitoba’s Pension Commission has recently invited submissions for
changes related to solvency requirements.
•  Quebec has introduced temporary measures providing for funding relief.
Quebec is also holding public consultations on various pension issues.
More encouraging to solvent plan members and following the Ontario
Court of Appeal’s recent decision in the case of Transamerica, the Financial
Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) published a new position on pension
asset transfers. The main impact of this decision is a reduced flexibility in the 
merging of pension plans or the transference of pension assets between plans.
Some can legitimately argue that this new directive will impede the popularity
of DB plans in their restructuring but one has to wonder if blending of 
solvent plans with weak or insolvent ones really accommodates anyone in the
long term.
On July 29, 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada released its landmark
judgement requiring that surplus attributable to a partial wind-up group be 
distributed at the time of the partial wind-up and not at a subsequent date.
Even though the judgement is directly relevant to Ontario legislation, the
expectation is that other jurisdictions with similar statutory wording will 
likewise be affected. While there are supporters and non-supporters of this
decision, CGA-Canada continues to believe that neither extreme is in the best
interest of any or all parties. Rather, the position taken has been one of 
consensus and equity wherein reliance could be placed on time-weighted 
formulas which take into account the respective contribution values of 
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members and sponsors. Such a formula was put forward by CGA-Canada in
the fall of 2004 and can be found by visiting www.cga-online.org/canada.   
In contrast to serious pension funding issues that have surfaced within the
private sector, the proposed new OMERS governance model
26 Bill 206 “An
Act to Revise the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System Act”
received first reading on June 1, 2005. This legislation, if passed would give
municipal employers and employees greater control of the Ontario Municipal
Employees Retirement System (OMERS). The new governance model would
include a Sponsors Corporation consisting of employer and employee 
representatives as well as an administrative corporation continuing in the role
of the current OMERS Board. The new model would give different member
groups the ability to tailor plans to meet unique group needs (e.g. police
forces, etc). The model would also include a formal dispute resolution 
mechanism with mediation and arbitration similar to that of the Ontario
Teachers’plan. Government intends to have the new bill in place in early 2006.
With regards to the decision in February’s federal budget to lift the cap 
on pension investment in foreign equities, the expectation is that Canadian 
pension funds will, on average, raise their foreign content to about 33% 
from the current average of about 26% (Globe and Mail, Pension Funds,
June 27, 2005).
26  Canadian NewsWire. June 1, 2005. “Ontario Government proposes new OMERS governance model”
(Bill 206).
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From the perspective of Canada’s Labour Unions, Ken Georgetti, president of
the Canadian Labour Congress, suggests Canadians have reason to worry
about their pensions: “Poll after poll tells us 3 out of 4 Canadians worry about
having enough to live on when they retire — these are the hard realities the 
budget failed to address.
27”
According to Mr. Georgetti, the pension problem could have been, but was
not, addressed in the February 2005 federal budget. The Canadian pension
issue is made more prominent, in Mr. Georgetti’s opinion, by virtue of the fact
that from 1992, for the first time in decades, the percentage of employed 
people who belong to workplace pensions started to decline.
Recently published research by the Wharton School, Pension Research
Council confirms that “future challenges to both the public and the private 
pillars of the Canadian retirement system will require regulatory reform in the
medium term.” In supporting their conclusion the Wharton researchers state
that from 1986 to 1996 annual contributions to the Canada Pension Plan
(CPP) increased by 0.2%, reaching 5.6% of maximum contributory earnings
in 1996. In 1997 the funding crisis resulted in an increase in contributions to
2003 of 9.9% where they are projected to remain for some years. These 
premiums are sufficiently high to accumulate surpluses until 2021 (McNaughton,
2004, as quoted in the Wharton paper).
The “pension system” perspective advocated by CGA-Canada gives 
substance to a recent “warning” from Michael Robinet, vice president of 
global forecasting for the Michigan-based automotive consulting firm CSM
Worldwide. Mr. Robinet recently stated that “Canadian automotive plants 
will become less competitive with rival factories in parts of South America
and Asia — where workers earn less — if they keep winning big wage and
benefit increases.”
28
And yet in stark contrast and seemingly undaunted by the prospect of
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27  Canadian Labour Congress. March 1, 2005. "Retirement Income: Canadians' Worries Ignored" as 
posted to CLC web site.
28 Vander Doelen, Chris. June 8, 2005. "Canadian GM workers won't escape cuts" Financial Post.
Table 7: Percentage of Canadians in Workplace Pension Plans (11)
1992     49% 90%
2002 44% 83%
Year
% of Canadians in  % of those Canadians in 
workplace pension plans DB plans
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reduced competitiveness, CAW president Buzz Hargrove announced recently
that because “the CAW has earned its benefits,” there will be no relief in 
benefit demands during the current round of contract negotiations with
Canada’s domestic auto manufacturers.  
In Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada it is suggested that
entrenched in the pension funding dilemma is the desirability to empower
pension plan members to attain increased understanding of their pension
arrangements; intrinsic risks, entitlements and expectations; and the actions
they might pursue in planning for retirement. With the one exception noted
below, it does not appear that employers have taken any significant initiative
to “empower pension plan members.”  
The notable exception to an absence of employee empowerment comes 
out of a recent survey of Canadian CFOs by Watson Wyatt. The CFO 
survey report states that “most companies have made changes to the amount
of education made available to plan members (for both DB and DC plans).”
However, while the survey of CFOs refers to a greater amount of education,
we have found no information to date on how effective this education 
has been. 
On a related note Joe Hornyak, executive editor of Benefits and Pensions
Monitor offers the opinion that “Judges don’t understand pensions.”  Whereas
the position of the Ontario courts was to insist on the distribution of pension
assets in the Monsanto case, parts of Europe and Quebec have dropped the
“partial wind-up” process. And issues of fairness, solvency and sustainability
aside, the approximately 200 partial wind-up reports sitting with no action in
Ontario hints to an additional problem of legislative paralysis.
According to Mr. Hornyak, most people today use RRSPs to defer taxes.
In fact, he goes on to say that tax deferment as opposed to post-retirement
income planning is promoted by both employers and the banks.  
Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School have
identified a number of important concerns related to Canada’s evolving pension
system including:
1. Increasing public pension demands competes for other tax dollars within
Canada’s already ailing public health care system.
2. The Association of Canadian Pension Management (ACPM) suggests that
Canada’s transfer payments to the elderly are too generous.
3. The dependency ratio (i.e. inactive people over 55 relative to the active
labour force 15 years and older) for Canada is projected to double between
the year 2000 and 2030.
4.  The current tax system penalizes Canadians who gradually withdraw from
the labour force.
5.  Demographically, Canadians 65 and over constituted 8% of the population
in 1971, 13% in 2001, is projected to be 15% in 2011, 19% by 2021 and
21% by 2026. 
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Despite their general optimism, as reflected in Tables 8, 9 and 10
29, the
CFOs surveyed by Watson Wyatt expect the current funding crisis to have a
substantial impact on the pension environment (see Table 11). On the other
hand the majority of CFOs consider the crisis to be cyclical.  
“Nearly 75% of the CFOs expect current conditions to result in a number
of DB plans being closed to new members. Eighty-two percent foresee 
various DB plans being replaced by DC plans. Thirty-four percent predict that
some organizations will pay cash in lieu of pension benefits.”
As an overall response to the pension issues as reported by CFOs, the 
following behaviours have been observed:
1. The most typical reaction to under-funding has been a review of their 
funding, investment and accounting policies.  
29 As replicated from The Conference Board of Canada. November 2004. “Is There a Pension Plan Crisis?
Table 9: CFO Perspectives on Crisis Severity
Perspective Respondents (%)
Problem is isolated/limited 29
Problem is widespread but cyclical 39
Problem is severe/will linger 20
Source: The Conference Board of Canada
Table 10: Expectations for Long-Term Bond Yields
Direction of Change Respondents (%)
Higher 32
About the same 50
Lower 18
Source: The Conference Board of Canada
Table 8: Number of Pension Plans Sponsored
Number of Pension Plans Respondents 






Source: The Conference Board of Canada
82% of CFOs expect
various DB plans will be
replaced by DC plans
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2.  Only 39% plan to contribute above minimum required, 41% reported 
no planned changes, 20% plan to reduce their contributions to minimum
contributions.
3. Fifty percent are assessing the skill sets of and styles of their investment
managers to better match them with their liability structure. However, that
said, 82% do not plan to modify their investment strategy. 
4. Ninety percent are not considering eliminating smoothing or amortization
practices; which is “interesting in view of the general move in accounting
circles to a ‘mark to market’approach in all aspects of the income statement
and balance sheet”.
5. Sixty-seven percent are not contemplating any changes to pension risk
sharing even though this might help preserve DB plans.  
6.  Most companies have made changes to amount of education made available
to plan members (for both DB and DC plans).  
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•  Employers have continued the trend of restructuring and/or replacing
defined benefit pension plans with less financially onerous retirement
arrangements. For example, employed Canadians in workplace pension
plans dropped by 5% between 1992 and 2002 (see Table 7). As Table 11
below indicates, 82% of CFOs surveyed recently foresee defined benefit
plans being replaced with defined contribution plans.
•  Although there are examples of significant investments to under-funded
plans, generally plan deficits continue to be a major symptom of what
CGA-Canada refers to as the current Canadian pension system 'dilemma'.
•  The Wharton School's Pension Research Council convincingly argues that
a serious issue for Canada's pension system is the growth of defined 
contribution plans outside of the pension regulatory framework.
•  Demographics including most particularly Canada's aging population 
further exacerbates the already tenuous state of the DB pension system. 
For example, the dependency ratio (i.e. in-actives over 55 relative to active
labour force participants 15 years and up) will double between 2000 and 2030.
•  There is no indication as yet that legislators are considering alternate 
methods for distributing pension surpluses in the case of partial wind-ups.
•  There has been a noticeable increase in the perceived need to improve the
amount of education and communication provided to retirees and pension
plan members.  
•  Pension liabilities, which have continued to increase for a large number of
Canadian employers, are still not fully accounted for on the organizations'
balance sheet.
Summary of Key Findings 
Identified During the Process 8
Table 11: Impact of Current Situation on Pension Plans
Impact Respondents  (%)
Many DB plans will be closed to new members 75
Many corporations will replace DB plans with DC plans 82
Many corporations will pay cash in lieu of pension benefits 34
Source: The Conference Board of Canada
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•  The recently tabled OMERS governance model (via Bill 206) will improve
plan flexibility and give municipal employees and employers greater 
control over the management of the assets.
•  Globalization creates another level of complexity and concern for pension
system stakeholders. Outsourcing and off-shoring have helped to improve
near term employer competitiveness. However, new evidence shows that
these productivity gains have been at the cost of significant job loss for
many Canadian workers, especially those in the manufacturing sector.
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The current economic and legislative environment within which pension plans
are expected to function is complex. Increasingly, pension plan management
has occupied prominent relevance on the agendas of organizations and their
members. Adding to this complexity and the acute attention directed at the
matter, is the multitude of participants and stakeholders attracted to, and
affected by, those decisions. Fraught with competing benefit, funding, investment
and accounting policy decisions, few topics demarcate as clearly the divergence
of interests which can exist between the various participants and the emphasis
or importance directed to the matter by these stakeholders. 
Within such a complex model, and as we have witnessed, it would be 
idealistic to simply expect all stakeholders to be reasonable over pension
rights and obligations; it is really not that straightforward. On the one hand,
employers, governments and the courts need to recognize that pensions are a
form of deferred compensation which is fittingly owed to the members. On the
other hand, members, bargaining units and unions must appreciate the external
impacts which cripple otherwise well-intended sponsor intentions and the 
economic realities of today’s markets and demographics. If some compromise
is not reached between these stakeholders, participation in DB plans will
merely decline or altogether disappear. In fact, it is already happening and the
current conflict emphatically serves to accelerate its demise. Nowhere is this
more evident than in Canada’s private sector.
Interestingly, last year’s recommendations (as reproduced as Appendix A)
continue to be relevant today. Some progress has been made in several regards
but, for the large part, it is our view that those who had predicted sponsor 
exodus from the DB plan marketplace had accurately foretold the inescapable
outcome. What is less obvious is why stakeholders have not compromised.
The heart of the true debate lies within the two conflicting views of the
pension “deal”: 
•  the accounting/economic view where pension assets and liabilities are 
corporate assets and liabilities; where plan members are secured creditors
to whom pensions are owed; and where experience gains and losses accrue
to shareholders; and 
•  the judicial/legislative view where pension assets are legally distinct from
corporate assets; where pension funds are managed by fiduciaries for the
benefit of plan members, not shareholders, and where shareholders are
responsible for deficits while the ownership of surplus remains in dispute.
Closing Comments 9
Participation in DB 
plans will decline or
altogether disappear
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Surely, an argument may be made for either. That is, if we continue to
ignore that pension and retirement benefits, are in reality, a form of deferred
compensation. If we accept that pensions are a component of compensation,
we are hard pressed to accept the first view. As a form of compensation, we
can not discount the notion that pension benefits accrued are in fact a future
promise for services rendered today. An employer should no sooner be capable
of abdicating itself from its promised pension obligations than any other form
of contractual undertaking.
Having said that, plan sponsors should not be penalized for effective plan
management (i.e. surplus), given that members have entrusted the sponsor 
to satisfy the pension obligation accruing from that trust. In other words,
members should not seek to receive a premium over and above the pledged
amount. Special circumstances of surplus emanating from plan restructuring
or plan wind-down (partial or otherwise) could however be subject to other
special rules which rely on time-weighted, contribution-rated formulas as 
that produced by CGA-Canada in late 2004. Our reasoning for this caveat is
that, the term of plan obligations towards individual members or groups of 
members is mitigated by the fact that benefit security for those members has
been infringed and the collective member stake has been abridged. 
At this juncture, many would agree that defined benefit pension plans have
lost their appeal; mostly due to all of the contentious issues and events that
have transpired. We can not reasonably expect a resurgence of those plans but
we can moderate the pace of decline of enduring plans while providing a
framework which better enables the creation of new or redesigned plans.
Otherwise, we can expect to experience continued diminishment of member
interests; especially in the competitive private sector where the risks and costs
can not, and should not, be disregarded. This report has not spoken to it, but
the very imbalance in DB plan participation which is now mounting between
in the public and private sectors will bring about a whole new multitude of
human capital issues for Canada. 
If we are to assure sustainability and confidence in DB pension plans, it
will be necessary to address these fundamental challenges and to seek out
meaningful compromises which promote greater plan certainty, credibility,
viability and longevity. 
Defined benefit 
pension plans have 
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June 2004 Recommendations
•  Pension fund administrators, relying on risk budgeting processes, could be
required to better justify their choice of investment mix and should also
disclose how anticipated risk is to be measured, managed and otherwise
mitigated where actual experience fares poorly.
•  Securities regulators could decree a greater degree of disclosure and/or the
rating of pension-related risk being carried by publicly traded companies. 
•  Given the imperfections cited throughout this report related to pension plan
administration, members’ growing reliance of pension benefits and the
weakened confidence in pension fund performance, greater emphasis
should be placed on the design and sustainability of pension plans. While
advocating for possible change, stakeholders should strengthen their 
planning and policy development activities, taking into account all the 
pension related issues.
•  Regulators will need to address the question of pension surplus ownership
if sponsors are to be held accountable. Within the current landscape, 
surplus distribution is simply not seen as fair and equitable to plan sponsors.
When determining the attribution of pension plan surpluses, there may 
be an opportunity to establish time-weighted formulas which take into
account the respective contribution values of members and sponsors. 
•  Workplace pension arrangements and the roles, responsibilities and 
obligations of the various participants involved in the management of 
those pension plans should be fully articulated and communicated to all
key stakeholders.
•  While reliance on pension advisory committees and pension committees
should be fostered, the regulatory and legal framework should provide
greater protection against litigation to those who would agree to serve in an
agency relationship. Consideration should also be given to including 
provisions for errors and omissions insurance coverage for those who serve
in such capacities. 
•  Regulators could require actuarial valuations more frequently than once
every three years where deterioration of solvency ratios (on a predefined
Appendix A 10
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basis) may warrant; especially where plan asset returns have fared less
favourably than earlier communicated predictions.
•  Accounting and actuarial standard setting bodies should be encouraged to
analyse and report back on alternative reporting standards with particular
attention being devoted to the practicality of adopting modern economic
principles based on fair value.
•  Regulators should continue to explore harmonization of jurisdictional 
provisions in the spirit of simplifying administration and conformance.
•  Regulators should develop common provisions for a plan sponsor which
has operations in multiple provinces (e.g. Hudson’s Bay Company), and in
the absence of harmonized regulations or uniform law, should examine
allowing the sponsor to be regulated by one agency.
•  In the face of growing obligations and the shrinking labour force entry
rates, sponsors and bargaining units should revisit early retirement 
schemes adopted under circumstances which substantially differ from 
current-day realities.
•  Given the growing order of magnitude of pension plan assets and 
obligations, boards of directors, CEOs and CFOs should be encouraged
to pursue and adopt constantly evolving best practices as they relate to 
pension plan management.
•  Further study into other models such as co-op and hybrid pension models
vs. the current captive insurance company model (pledged benefit as a
function of contribution and sponsor diligence) should be commissioned.
At the heart of such a study, the benefits/costs/limitations of the alternatives
would undoubtedly shed light on any improvements in pension plan clarity
and identify disproportionate assumption of risks between participants. In
short, these alternative models promote risk-sharing and enjoin greater
member participation and self-reliance in retirement planning.
•  The Department of Finance Canada should revisit the 10% cap (disallowance
of surplus amounts which exceed liabilities by 10% or more) historically
placed on DB balance sheet surpluses in favour of elevating the limit, to
say 30%, or discarding the provision altogether. Retrospectively and
prospectively, we can expect that the 10% rule does in some instances 
force a sponsor to take contribution holidays when the sponsor may not
otherwise do so. 
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